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Abstract 
It can not be said that board-level employee representation is in the centre of attention in the European Union at the 
moment. Even though there are uncountable studies on how to enhance the EU legislation of board-level 
representation to ensure the workers participation in the employer’s decision-making in spite of the Member States’ 
regulations that vary greatly, there is no sign of such intention at European level at all. Member States without any 
legislation regarding board-level representation often argue that introducing such participatory rights would become 
an obstacle to the freedom of establishment and, in addition, would hinder the performance of companies. There is 
no proof that giving workers the right to participate would have catastrophic results, because Member States with 
strong participation schemes have strong position in the global and European market. Actually, the global financial 
and economic crisis proved, that those companies that strengthened participatory rights on board level mitigated the 
effects of the crisis, avoided redundancies and became profitable. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the global economic and financial crisis in 2008 was the first major economic challenge for the European 
Union (EU), it has brought some questions and problems out to the light regarding collective labour law and 
worker’s involvement in companies’ decision-making. Can the EU play a significant role in crisis management or 
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the Member States need to solve the arising problems on the national level? Is it possible to reduce the negative 
effects of the crisis – e.g. collective redundancies – through collective labour law regulations and put the Member 
States’ economies on the rise? 
The crisis had a direct impact both on employers and employees all over Europe and naturally, after losing their 
status in the market, employers tended to undermine the mandatory minimum standards for terms and conditions in 
employment relationships to save costs and to stay ‘alive’ in the single market.† Therefore there could be two 
outcomes regarding collective labour law institutions such as workers’ participation – either they weaken and lose 
their importance in industrial relationships, since the employees intentionally try to avoid cooperating with them as 
they mean an obstacle in business life, or right to the contrary, they are strengthened and make companies more 
efficient and profitable. Now it seems that the latter may come true, but it does not mean necessarily that employees’ 
participation rights are actually on the rise and will be in the future. Even so the EU and the Member States should 
reconsider the present regulations of board-level employee representation (henceforth BLER), since the crisis has 
taught us one thing: cooperating with workers instead of confronting with them can enhance the performance of 
companies in some cases. 
2. Connection between the right to information and consultation and the right to participate 
Before analysing the present situation of BLER in Europe, we need to see whether the right to information and 
consultation ensured in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (henceforth Charter) means the 
same as the right to participate, and if not, then whether there is a connection between them. 
According to Article 27 of the Charter workers’ right to information and consultation is a fundamental social 
right which means that workers or their representatives must be guaranteed information and consultation in good 
time and at the appropriate levels within the undertaking. To ensure this right both on national and European level, 
two important directives came to existence: 
x Directive 2002/14/EC on establishing a general framework for informing and consulting employees in the 
European Community.  By implementing this directive, Member States ensure workers’ right to information 
and consultation in the undertakings on national level, and not only for the employees of Community-scale 
undertakings. 
x Directive 2009/38/EC on the establishment of a European Works Council or a procedure in Community-scale 
undertakings and Community-scale groups of undertakings for the purposes of informing and consulting 
employees. This directive provide rules for transnational companies only, hence national undertakings have no 
obligation to establish works councils or similar structures or procedures. 
 Even so it must be noted that the right to information and consultation is not a weak version of the right to 
participate in the employer’s decision-making, since the objective of Article 27 of the Charter is not participation, 
but the protection of workers’ interests against the employer who owns a dominant position in situations in which 
those interests could be substantially affected. The article has two aims: on the one hand workers must be protected 
in extraordinary situations, such as collective redundancies and transfers of undertakings; on the other hand the EU 
needs to react to the globalisation of the economy and the problems created by it, such as the rise of transnational 
companies, mergers of undertakings and transfer of business from one Member State to another, and thus workers 
are made dependent on decisions taken in other Member States (Bercusson, 2006). 
 To sum it up, workers only have the right to be informed and consulted as a fundamental social right ensured 
Europe-wise, but not the right to participate and thus they rarely have the chance to influence the company’s 
decisions and strategies regarding business and industrial relations. For instance, when the employer closes one of 
its plants based in a Member State, the only right employees have is to know what will happen to them, express their 
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less. 
 In most cases employees have no actual influence on the company’s decision according to the right to 
information and consultation, since the employer’s only obligation is to try considering the suggestions and opinions 
of the employees. Therefore workers’ right to participate in the employer’s (company’s) decision-making is a 
completely different matter. Nonetheless, it can not be stated that there is no link between the right to information 
and consultation and the right to participate at all: participation rights can be regarded as a method of providing 
employees with information, and also create consultation opportunities, and thus these rights complement each other 
(Bruun, 2011). 
3. Workers’ right to participate in decision-making 
The phrase workers’ participation is used to encompass various forms of workers’ participation in decision-
making, mostly at the enterprise level. The types of these arrangements differ widely, ranging from co-determination 
to board-level representation and sometimes the different forms complement each other. In addition not only the 
forms of participation vary greatly, but the institutions and legislation of workers’ participation in the Member 
States as well. It must be clear that European regulations build on the existing diversity of national laws, and thus – 
according to the Commission and other EU institutions – harmonisation is out of the question at the moment. That is 
why even minimum standard provisions can not be found in EU law. 
Member States strongly oppose the possibility of changing their national legislation – if there is at all – regarding 
workers’ participation, mainly because of cultural reasons, even if legally enshrined workers’ participation 
represents an expression of socially responsible economic behaviour. On the other hand, in the European Social 
Model participatory rights for employees are regarded as an essential element of corporate decision-making and as a 
strength for an inclusive and competitive labour market (Bruun, 2011). It means that BLER is also an essential part 
of the European democracy, especially if we consider the company as a social grouping, in which the company 
management and employees work together with a common purpose – mainly to make the company more profitable. 
3.1. Board-level employee representation in national legislation 
There are different board structures coexisting in Europe, and the structure of the company and the board 
determines whether there is employee representation, and if there is, then the impact of their actions and whether 
they have decision-making or counselling right is determined by the board they are in. The already existing board 
structures are deeply rooted in the country’s economic and legal system, and usually the Member States have no 
intention of modifying these arrangements or introducing a new one, even though the EU acknowledges all forms. 
 A company either has a one-tier system (‘single board’ or ‘monistic’ system), a two-tier system (‘dual board’) or 
some kind of mixed system. Depending on the company’s board system workers’ representatives are on the 
supervisory board or the board of management. In the first case even though workers’ representatives have the same 
rights as all the other members, the supervisory board does not make decisions regarding the company’s life, only 
judges whether the activity of the management is contrary to the law, the constitution of the company, the resolution 
of the supreme body, or otherwise infringes the interests of the company [See e.g. the new Hungarian Civil Code. 
Act V of 2013 on Civil Code, Section 3:124 §], and therefore co-determination is out of the question. Workers’ 
representatives can only inform the workers they represent whether the company works according to the law and 
whether it infringes their rights claimed by the law. In a one-tier board system it is possible for the workers’ 
representatives to participate in the active management of the company as the members of the board of directors and 
one would think that they have a great influence on the decision, which is partly true, but regardless of which board 
the representatives are in, they are bound by the same obligations and thus they are to put the interests of the 
company first and foremost.  
 Ensuring BLER is beneficial not only to the workers, but to the company as well, because board composition 
plays a key role in a company’s success. Effective oversight of the executive directors or the management board by 
the non-executive directors or supervisory boards leads to successful governance of the company. But why is that? 
The diversity of competences and views among the board’s members facilitates understanding of the business 
organisation and affairs and thus enables the board to challenge the management’s decisions objectively and 
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constructively. It must be concluded that the lack of diversity could lead to less effective oversight of the 
management board or executive directors [COM(2012) 740 final,]. Hence employees’ representation in the 
supervisory board enhance the control over the board of management and improves the level of protection regarding 
workers’ interests, while workers’ participation in the board of management could make the operation of the 
company more effective and profitable by sharing the employees’ ideas and experiences with the executive directors 
about the market and the risks the company might take. 
 Because of the different board structures the legislation of Member States regarding BLER varies greatly, but 
according to the arrangements they can be divided into three groups (Kluge-Stollt-Conchon, 2013): 
x There is no legislation for BLER: Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Romania, the United Kingdom. 
x Legislation for BLER is provided, but it is limited to state-owned or privatised companies: Greece, Ireland, 
Poland, Portugal, Spain. 
x Legislation for BLER is provided for private companies, once they have reached a certain size: Austria, 
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden. 
In the present paper it is not possible to analyse the national legislations in detail. Even so, there is no doubt that 
national rules on BLER show high diversity [for differences in national legislation of BLER, see: Fulton (2013)]. 
According to the practice of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) having so many different arrangements in the EU 
regarding workers’ participation may have unexpected results. Firstly, it is possible that employers see board-level 
representation as a restriction of the freedom of establishment and thus they will not transfer their seats to Member 
States with a strong participation scheme. Secondly, some companies might use the freedom of establishment in 
order to avoid the mandatory rules regarding board-level representation applicable in certain countries. Even though 
the ECJ has confirmed that companies are to a great extent free to transfer their de facto head office to a Member 
State at their discretion, it definitely does not allow companies to use this freedom to avoid ensuring BLER rights. 
3.2. The possibility of a European-level regulation 
To some extent, the EU does have mandatory provisions relating to the Member States in connection with BLER, 
but only in cross-border relationships. According to Directive 2001/86/EC on SE Company Member States must lay 
down rules on employee involvement which must satisfy at least the so-called ‘standard rules’ set out in the Annex 
of the directive [Article 7]. Naturally, Member States may have different legislation, but it can not result in a weaker 
participation system than set out in the directive. These standard rules are applicable in the Member State in which 
the registered office of the SE is to be situated. Noticeably, in case of a transfer of the registered office the 
management shall draw up a transfer proposal which shall cover – besides many other issues – the implication the 
transfer may have on employees’ involvement. In the process of the transfer the management of the SE is free to 
determine which arrangement of the employee involvement will be applied after the transfer – the one regulated in 
the legislation of the Member State of the previous seat or the arrangement and standard rules of the Member State 
of the new seat. Clearly, the management of the SE have a choice, because each Member State shall have at least 
standard rules in case the Member State of the new seat has no legislation regarding BLER at all. 
 Besides setting standard rules for employee participation on board level, the Directive on SE has another 
remarkable provision. The directive offers a precise definition of participation which is completely different to the 
involvement of employees. The latter means any mechanism, including information, consultation and participation, 
through which employees’ representatives may exercise an influence on decisions to be taken within the company 
[Article 2 (h)]. Therefore employees’ involvement means not only the right to information and consultation – which 
is regulated in the EU by Directive 2002/14/EC on establishing a general framework for informing and consulting 
employees –, but includes the right to participate as well. In the application of the directive participation means the 
influence of the body representative of the employees and/or the employees’ representatives in the affairs of a 
company by ensuring either the right to elect or appoint some of the members of the company’s supervisory or 
administrative organ, or the right to recommend and/or oppose the appointment of some or all of the members of the 
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mentioned organs of the company [Article 2 (k)]. 
 By defining these two phenonemons, the EU recognised the right to participation, at least on board level. In 
addition it can be considered as the first step to the Europeanisation of BLER. Even if some observers conclude that 
the implementation of the SE statute has no significant effect, it can be the starting point of a possible legislation of 
minimum standard requirements regarding national rules on BLER that is applicable to national companies as well, 
not only in case of establishing or transferring an SE, but, even if they do not have cross-border operations. Board-
level employee representatives in the SE shall defend the common interest of all employees, even if they are in other 
Member States, thus the SE directive presents one of the most important elements of European democracy and the 
European Social Model. In addition, the employees of an SE located in a Member State without national BLER 
rights must be covered by the specific SE arrangements on participation, thus later the legislation can take a turn 
towards the spreading of BLER rights in the EU. The same seems to happen with works councils and similar 
structures, since by implementing the Directive 2009/38/EC on European Works Councils (EWC), community-scale 
undertakings shall establish either an employee information and consultation procedure, or a European Works 
Council. In the latter case each Member State needed to adopt subsidiary requirements that set out minim standards. 
 It is clear that the legislator is quite careful and thus has a tendency to only set the minimum standards for 
workers’ participation regardless – as it is seen in the Directive on EWC – to avoid the opposition of countries in 
which there is no legislation regarding workers’ participatory rights. Later, as the effect of the minimum standards 
of the Directive on SE, ensuring BLER rights might not be an extraordinary phenomenon anymore, and then the 
legislator will be able to move on to make more strict rules that has to be applied even by companies without cross-
border operations. 
It is necessary to move forward on this road, because it should not be forgotten, that the EU is not only an 
economic community, but a social one as well, and sometimes the social aims are more important – or at least that 
should be the case. Even more so since, by considering social factors, ensuring workers’ social rights and making a 
decision together with the employees, companies may become more profitable and efficient in the competition 
compared to those that disregards the workers’ point of view on an important issue, such as risk management. If the 
legislator wants to make the EU into one of the most dynamic and competitive economic area in the world, highly 
qualified workers are needed to be committed to their company. Together with good profitability BLER rights help 
to bind skilled workers to the undertaking (Kluge-Wilke, 2007). One way to achieve that is to make them interested 
in the business of their employer by letting them take part in the decision-making and make them feel as if the 
company’s problems are their problems, and the company’s success is their success. 
 Granting BLER rights to workers will help shape their working and living conditions, and the employer’s 
business will become more effective by cooperating with the employees, and the employer will not need to confront 
with them and deal with the market competition at the same time. It must be understood that BLER is not a 
competitive disadvantage to the companies. There were attempts to prove that ensuring workers’ participation has a 
negative effect on the company’s results in the competing market in contrast to employers without such schemes, 
but these attempts have failed, since empirical studies do not show any evidence of a correlation between BLER and 
the performance of the companies [see e.g. Report of the Reflection Group On the Future of EU Company Law 
(2011),]. For instance, in Germany the strong participatory rights do not hinder foreign direct investment and only a 
few companies avoid transferring into Germany because of the board-level representation. Actually countries with 
strict rules on BLER have a strong position in world and EU markets, such as Germany or the Nordic countries. The 
economic performance of these Member States does not justify the argument that abandoning BLER rights would 
enhance productivity. The truth is that empirically it has not been proved that Member States without any BLER 
rights fare comparatively better either – even though the United Kingdom (UK) has no legislation regarding 
workers’ right to participate on board level at all, economically it is one of the strongest Member State in the EU and 
companies stated in the UK are important actors in the single market. Mainly this is the reason why the Reflection 
Group on the future of EU Company Law stated that BLER is basically not an economic related question, but rather 
an issue of a consciously taken political choice which must be respected. According to the report of the Reflection 
Group the EU should be neutral to Member States’ systems on the condition that this does not contradict principles 
and freedoms of the internal market. If the European legislator finds that there is such a system, necessary steps shall 
be taken to provide for a discrimination-free regulation on the Member States’ level. 
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The Reflection Group disregarded an important matter: employee participation forms are a main element of the 
social policy of the EU. It is important to strengthen the social dialogue in every possible way to promote mutual 
trust within the undertakings in order to improve risk anticipation and make work organisation more flexible 
[Directive 2002/14/EC Preamble (7)] which can increase the competitiveness of the company. In my opinion, 
introducing BLER rights is one of the most effective way to ensure social dialogue between the employer and the 
employees, because if the employer has to make a decision together with the employees instead of only having a 
possibility to start a dialogue without any legal obligation, it is a guarantee for workers that their social interests and 
rights will not be intrigued or disregarded. As it was stated above, the ECJ has found that companies often use 
business transfer as a mean to avoid applying BLER schemes, so it is clear that some kind of minimum standard 
legislation is needed which binds all companies in the EU equally and stops this tendency of avoiding BLER rights. 
4. The effect of the global financial and economic crisis 
The global financial and economic crisis caused an increase of the competition in the market. Employers can be 
divided into two groups according to the measures they have undertaken in order to raise productivity. The first 
group started to cut costs and decided on collective redundancies, thus there was a radical increase of unemployment 
rates in all Member States. The other group learned the lesson the crisis taught us: they opened the possibility for 
employees to take part in the employers’ decision-making and started a healthy argument on risk management and 
working conditions in order to achieve profitability again.  
 Therefore the EU should learn from the crisis’ effect on companies behaviour towards BLER rights and start to 
establish a legislation to ensure at least minimum standards for employees regarding participatory rights on board 
level, since such processes are frequently used tools during periods of crisis. Then why not use it to avoid such crisis 
or to mitigate a future crisis in advance?  
5. Conclusion 
 In my opinion after the global financial and economic crisis EU legislation on BLER rights both on national and 
European level should be improved to avoid the negative effects of a future crisis and to let the employers and 
employees start a conversation in order to enhance profitability and risk management. There is no need to harmonise 
the Member States’ legislation as the EU is founded on the respect of cultural diversity. Even so, setting some 
minimum standards would definitely improve the European social policy, the employees’ working conditions and 
enhance the companies’ growth and competitiveness. At least in those Member States that has no legislation 
regarding BLER, some kind of regulation is needed to complement other participatory structures and to avoid the 
possibility that in some countries workers will not be protected. That would be an obstacle to the freedom of 
movement for workers. And last, but not least, giving employers and employees the chance to start a dialogue and 
make decisions that respect the interests of both parties would lessen the need for the state and the EU to interfere in 
order to protect the mentioned interests. All in all, strengthening the present legislation of BLER rights would make 
the single market and its actors more efficient, and would protect workers at the same time. 
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